

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 1, 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
✓ Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Subject: Organization of the Psychological Strategy Board

In accordance with my conversation this morning with Allan Dulles, I am attaching copies of draft material relating to a proposed report by the Bureau of the Budget to the President dealing with the organization of the Psychological Strategy Board. It is my understanding that the members of the Board are meeting at lunch today and might have an opportunity to go over the draft material. We are particularly interested in having the views of the members of the Board on the proposed memorandum from the President and, of course, would welcome any major suggestions with respect to the draft report itself.

We will be in touch with you to discuss any particular recommendations incorporated in the report if that would be helpful.


Assistant Director

25X1

Attachment

NSC review(s) completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Organization and Operation of the Psychological Strategy Board

In accordance with our recent conversation and at your request there is attached a summary report on the organization and operation of the Psychological Strategy Board since its establishment by you approximately one year ago.

While the preparation of this report was initiated prior to the recent report to you on the same subject by Mr. Gordon Gray, it takes into account specific recommendations made by him on the organization and procedures of the Board. The report itself has been discussed informally with members of the Board and we have reflected their views in it where considered appropriate. We have also consulted with Mr. Sidney Souers in the preparation of the report.

There is also attached a proposed memorandum which, if you approve, would direct the Board to make certain modifications in existing procedures and organization. These changes have the concurrence of the Board. The Budget Bureau's report in general supports the directive which you issued last year and the modifications are designed to strengthen it as an instrument for achieving more effective planning through the organized utilization of the resources of the three participating agencies, rather than as an instrument of independent staff work and advice to the President.

Director

Attachment

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 952

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, Central Intelligence

At my direction the Director of the Bureau of the Budget has undertaken a study to determine whether the directive of April 4, 1951 which established the Psychological Strategy Board and defines its concept, organization and relationships should now be amended in the light of the initial experiences of the Board. In addition to having the results of that study, I have also had the benefit of other thoughtful comment and suggestion.

I particularly do not believe that steps toward a greater independence either of the Board or its Director should be taken at this time.

progress and are hereby authorized and directed.

1. The Board's responsibilities for forward strategic planning toward a national psychological effort should be stressed. The Board should not accept responsibilities for current planning at the expense of that fundamental role. The Board should encourage the strengthening of other mechanisms and procedures for coordination at the departmental level which will permit a progressive reduction of its own coordinating activities.
2. A practice of rotation among the members of the Board of the position of chairman would most suitably signify the intent of the directive of April 4, 1951. An important objective of that directive was to relieve the members of the Board by utilization of the Director in organizing its business including the expediting of reaching decisions and the Board may, if it so chooses, utilize

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

I believe that it would be helpful to me if the Board could suggest occasions when I might become more directly informed of its work through a meeting with the Board, the Director and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

I am transmitting the report of the Bureau of the Budget for further study and appropriate action of the Board.

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

The Psychological Strategy Board
Selected Aspects of its Concept,
Organization and Operations

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION**

April 30, 1952

This report results from a study of the PSB approximately one year after the issuance by the President of a Directive establishing it. The study was directed solely toward an appraisal of the concept underlying the framework in which the Board was created and did not undertake a direct appraisal of the efficiency with which the Board or its staff has set about its tasks. This report, therefore, is not a full and fair picture and should be taken as reflecting on no ones performance. It discusses, in very condensed form, only those aspects of the Board's organization, procedures and relationships which have occasioned the more significant differences of view or which appear to be most in need of clarification, alteration, or other particular notice or attention at this time. It reflects consideration of varying proposals for change which have been advanced including those of the Board's first Director.

CONCLUSIONS

Three principal conclusions result:

1. A healthy start has been made.
2. The basic framework provided for in the Directive of April 4, 1951, has proven sound in today's situation. No major defects exist which would warrant amending the basic Directive though a few minor amendments suggest themselves, should it be determined advisable to amend the Directive at a later time.
3. In a number of respects, clarification, alteration, or particular attention or notice to the Board's role, organization, or relationships is desirable. These, however, can be taken, with the approval and direction of the President, within the framework of the existing directive.

DISCUSSION →

It should be remembered that while the Directive establishing the Board was issued a year ago, it was several months before a Director was on hand. The hesitations and difficulties of the subsequent few months were no greater than those experienced by any new undertaking, especially one so complex and so intimately enmeshed with responsibilities already assigned to other major departments and agencies. Further the Board came into being only after a long period of consideration which was characterized by wide difference of views respecting its role, mission, structure, etc. While those differences persist, though less vigorously advocated than before, the Board has been able to accomplish its principal organizational tasks and to complete some needed planning towards specific psychological objectives.

TOP SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION**

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

ROLE AND MISSION

During its consideration of proposals for a more vigorous psychological effort, the NSC had been presented with an organizational issue which in fact reflected wide divergency of view in concept and policy. It is natural that these disparate views would reappear as the PSB, with borrowed staff, undertook to get underway.

An examination of the effectiveness of PSB as a mechanism to achieve the President's stated objectives for a more effective national psychological effort and a consideration of proposals for change must be viewed in terms of those differing concepts. It is helpful to condense the presentation of the differing views which have been and, to a degree, are still held by very briefly summarizing the extremes since it is in their extremes that they have tended to influence most greatly the developments which have occurred.

The extreme of one view would picture the Board as the headquarters for the cold war. In this view the Board's concern would embrace any or all of the major policies, programs or activities of the Government. With a thus broad concern the Board would have a matching broad responsibility and authority. It would ensure that psychological considerations were brought to bear in the shaping of all, except purely domestic, national policies and programs and when in its view, the psychological considerations should be the determining ones, would exercise an independence in presenting its view in the top councils of the Government. This concept would require extensive organization, a large group of independent personnel, an independence for its Director and a pattern of relationships with the President and the National Security Council independent of those which its member departments could provide.

At the other extreme was the view that what was intended was merely an expansion or intensification of psychological operations then being carried on. It saw the Board as being concerned only with programs specifically identified as psychological operations, such as propaganda and the like, and the Board's concern therefore as the support or implementation through such psychological operations of national objectives, policies and programs developed through other mechanisms without the participation or contribution of the Board. Organizationally, therefore, the Board would provide primarily for an elevation of mechanisms already existing to coordinate operations, its staff would be wholly borrowed from operators engaged in the conduct or planning of psychological programs. The Board would provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and information, a committee type structure for the coordination of psychological plans. Its Director would serve as a secretary and staff officer of the Board itself and neither he nor the Board would have any pattern of relationships except that provided through its member departments.

Discussion of these differing views consumed a considerable part of the time of the Board and its staff in its first few months. It was not until the Board approached its initial job in terms of problems rather than concept that it was able to come to sufficient agreement to begin its task. Such agreement was easiest in terms of specific and immediate problems which were already in a status of interdepartmental discussion and negotiation.

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

The Director was conscious of the need to lift the Board's activities to a strategic plane in point of level and to the longer range problems in point of time. He cautioned against the acceptance of problems of a purely inter-departmental or current nature to a degree which would adversely affect the Board's capacity to develop its more long-range, strategic program. His initial list of problems included a plan for strategic planning not previously initiated. In practice, however, a sufficiently large agenda of currently unsolved problems to consume the efforts of the PSB planning staff and facilities was available from the interdepartmental mechanisms then existing, from the NSC and, in a few cases, from the suggestion of certain officials. The long-range projects included in the Director's first list of problems have therefore not been pursued with vigor nor supported by the best available PSB or departmental staff.

The resultant tendency to restrict the Board's concern to current problems has affected its program in two other areas as well (1) evaluation and (2) coordination.

It has organized only a limited program in the field of evaluation. While it has been able to complete some specific projects such as the appraisal of the impact of the disarmament proposals it has not yet developed plans, techniques, nor staff for full-scale evaluation of the national effort. Yet it is precisely this activity which will fertilize and support a program of forward strategic planning.

Many of the Board's activities in the field of coordination are either of a purely administrative nature or in the area of operational coordination which the Directive clearly leaves with the departments. The responsibilities of the member departments for the planning, conduct and coordination of actual operations is not diminished by the President's directive. The Board should resist the tendency which its existence furthers of utilizing it for the coordination of matters the responsibility for which should rest with the departments. Each of the departments involved were directed to strengthen the existing arrangements within their departments for those purposes and the Secretary of State was authorized to effect such changes in the interdepartmental coordinating mechanisms established under NSC 59/1.

If the Board is to fulfill the objectives of the President's Directive it will be necessary to shift its emphasis to provide for a greater and more adequate scheduling and support of longer-range planning and coordination programs and a more selective approach to coordination. It is in these directions, however, that the member agencies are most alert to the possibility of the Board usurping responsibilities except in the single case of planning for the extremely long-range and tenuous prospect of general hostilities. The Board's role and responsibility for forward strategic planning may thus need to be reaffirmed.

The Board thus will need the support of a clarification, or, more properly, an iteration, of its role in forward strategic planning.

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

It is recommended that the Board's responsibility for forward and strategic planning both for specifically identified psychological operations and for the psychological aspects of a national effort be reaffirmed.

It is further recommended that the Board give immediate attention to the problem of developing within the resources available through its member agencies and through a concomitant adjustment of its full-time staff and its work priorities, adequate staffing and support of its responsibilities for forward strategic planning and for the evaluation of the total national psychological effort.

It is also recommended that the Board encourage the strengthening of mechanisms and procedures for the coordination of psychological operations at the interdepartmental level and plan for a progressive reduction of its own activity in this field.

RELATIONSHIPS

The differing views of the Board's role and mission have played an equally substantial part in the shaping of the Board's external relationships. Recommendations have been made from time to time which would, if adopted, move in the direction of greater independence, either for the Board or its Director, or both. Such a move would run counter to the basic concept of the President's directive, the need for which is not demonstrated by study of the Board's experience. The Board was established as a means of achieving more effective planning, through an organized utilization of the resources of the principal agencies rather than providing for an independent source of staff work and advice to the President.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT

The Director of the Board as well as the Under Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence who comprise its membership, are Presidential appointees. Their relationship with the President either as individuals or in their capacities related to the PSB is essentially a matter peculiarly personal to the President. Nevertheless, the desirability has been advanced of affording the President an opportunity to inform himself directly of the views and work of the Board through the assignment to the Director of responsibility for a regularized periodic personal reporting.

It is suggested that, should the President desire to be informed directly of the Board's work and views, he meet, as the need arises, with the Board as a whole, the Director of PSB and the Executive Secretary of the NSC.

RELATIONSHIP WITH NSC

The development of the actual relationship with NSC, as well as current proposals for establishing formally a relationship between the member

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET **SECURITY INFORMATION**

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

agencies, has to be viewed in terms of the conflicting concepts of the Board's role. These views reemerged strongly on the occasion when the Board formally defined its relationship with the NSC with the result that a very rigid pattern was the only one capable of formal agreement. PSB participation in matters potentially or actually before the NSC, for example, was to be entirely through the member departments.

In actual practice and through informal means a more advantageous relationship has developed. There have been occasions, both at the NSC level, and more frequently at the Senior Staff level, in which participation of the Director or staff of PSB has been of advantage. The heads of the departments comprising the PSB may desire the attendance of the Director to interpret the relationship of matters before the NSC to approved objectives and policies of the PSB. This type of participation may be expected to broaden as the Board progresses with its forward and strategic planning. Similarly the work of both the PSB and the Senior Staff will be advantaged by free exchange of information and by the participation of the PSB.

The NSC also has been an important source of activity of the Board through

1. requesting PSB study and advice in connection with proposals before the NSC.
2. the full participation of a PSB representative in the NSC Senior Staff.

The development of the NSC relationship has therefore been somewhat of a compromise of the two extreme views of the Board's role and, through informal means, has served to temper the rigidity of relationship which the Board formally adopted.

The formalization of the relationships of the Board, and especially its Director, with the NSC, would involve a careful balancing of a number of important relationships. It should be an unusual situation in which the Director would wish to make a presentation of the Board's views or to speak for the Board prior to the formal approval by the Board itself. Such approval involves a consideration within the departments of the special area of PSB's concern in relation to the broader concerns of the same departments in their NSC capacity. The obvious intent of having provided for a Board structure for PSB is to insure this correlation and, if necessary, subordination, of psychological considerations with broader considerations of high military or foreign policy and with operational feasibility. Each member is on the Board for some aspect of that purpose. To provide formally therefore for an independent representation in the NSC for the PSB would involve a departure from the concept of PSB expressed in the President's Directive, the necessity for which is not yet demonstrated. The development of these relationships, therefor, should continue as at present.

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

TOP SECRET **SECURITY INFORMATION**

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

The President's Directive, however, prescribes one relationship of PSB to the NSC which has not been fully developed. The Directive requires the PSB to make reports to the NSC on its evaluation of the national psychological effort and on the implementation by the departments and agencies concerned of the approved policies and programs of the Board. An adequate program has not yet been developed for carrying this out. The importance of such a program to the role of the Board has already been discussed. It is equally important to the relationship of NSC and PSB. Adequate reports of this type would afford the best method for ensuring the meshing of psychological considerations with the broadest considerations at top planning levels. It would do so, further, without violence to the carefully balanced relationships of the member agencies to the PSB and to the NSC.

It is recommended that the relationships of the Board or its Director with the NSC not be formalized but remain as at present. The Board, however, should take steps to develop a system of reports to the NSC as required by the President's Directive.

Relationship with the JCS.

The President's Directive provides that a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sit with the Board in order that the Board may relate its planning to approved plans for military operations. In actual practice the relationships of the Board and the JCS have developed so that the Board obtains the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views on Board proposals rather than their advice on approved military operations.

The collegiate nature of the JCS organization requires that their views be obtained formally through the submission of specific proposals. This procedure forestalls negotiation and advice and representatives of the JCS have generally been able only to state, not negotiate, the JCS views. The Board has been able to relieve this difficulty somewhat by informal contact through the Joint Staff and on occasion through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These difficulties may have been a factor in the proposal that the President designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the representative referred to in the President's Directive. The more important aspect of that proposal, however, concerns its relationship to the concept of the Board as an independent group.

As in the case of the NSC, the relationships of the PSB to the JCS involve careful balancing of a number of other important relationships including that of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense with the JCS. Some of the members of PSB would view the formal designation of the Chairman of the JCS as a participant in PSB matters as moving farther than is necessary or desirable towards an independence for PSB. There is the further view that the proposal would not necessarily solve the difficulties of securing expeditiously the advice of the JCS.

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01751R003800130001-1

It is recommended that action not be taken towards directing that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the representative of the JCS with the PSB envisioned in the Directive of April 4, 1951, but that the Board continue to develop its relationships with the JCS as at present.

The Board, Chairman and Director.

The Directive establishing the PSB places the responsibilities assigned in the Board. It, however, provides for a Presidentially appointed Director, provides that he direct all activities under the Board, and gives him freedom to organize the staff and its work, including staff detailed as well as assigned. The obvious intent is to create a Director capable of proceeding to carry out responsibilities assigned to the Board as a whole while at the same time retaining ultimate control in the Board. The Board as a whole as well as in their individual capacities represent the major departments whose activities the PSB will most vitally affect and are thus in a position to insure that psychological considerations of proposed policy and program are related to the broader considerations of foreign and military policy and program on the one hand and firm intelligence estimates and operating feasibility on the other. Each member of the Board may be viewed as present primarily for one of these purposes.

It is natural that during the early stages of the Board's existence it might wish to exercise a closer review and approval over details particularly of structure procedures and work priorities than would be either consistent with the broader intent of the Board's own role or necessary or desirable after the Director and his staff have shaped a more continuing program. Sufficient progress has been made to indicate the wisdom of effecting several adjustments in the concepts and procedures of the Board, which through a process of evolution would place greater freedom of action and greater responsibility for the direction of the Board's activities while retaining ultimate control over the vital substantive decisions.

It is recommended that the Board begin a progressive delegation to the Director to direct the activities of the Board and to act and speak for the Board on matters which the Board has approved. Such delegation should include a greater utilization of the Director in the manner prescribed by the President's Directive in organizing the business of the Board itself including expediting the reaching of decisions.

The President's Directive provides that the Board select a Chairman but prescribes not duties. The practice of the Board initially to handle formally many matters for which it can now begin to rely upon the Director has given the position of Chairman a significance beyond that intended by the Directive with a consequent diminution of the role of the Director.

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01751R003800130001-1

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

This has lead to the suggestion that the President now designate the Director as Chairman. Had this been recommended at the time the Directive was issued and had the role of Chairman as essentially a Presiding Officer been more directly defined, a perhaps clearer relationship as among the Board, Chairman and Director might have evolved. The significance which the role of Chairman has acquired, however, would lend a significance to the designation of the Director as Chairman in relation to the concept of the Board's role. Further amendment of the Directive is not necessary. An alternative which would clarify the relationship and minimize any future potential difficulty is that suggested above, namely a progressive withdrawal from operating detail accompanied by a greater reliance on the Director to organize the staff and activities under the Board and the work of the Board itself. As evidence of the thus reduced significance of the position of Chairman, the Board should adopt a practice of rotating the Chairman.

It is recommended that the Board adopt the practice of rotating the assignment to this position and that it press a program to implement the preceding recommendation relating to a progressively greater reliance on the Director for the smooth functioning of the Board itself.

Board Membership.

The Board has considered on a number of occasions the question of its membership with the conclusion that no additional members are needed or desirable. On one occasion the Board expressed the view that the President's Directive did not intend any additional permanent members.

This point of view of the Board has not prevented it from including in its formal meetings a wide selection of officials of other agencies. Further at staff levels, the Board has made extensive use of assistance from an even broader group.

The range of the Board's concern covers on occasion more agencies than are now members. The list of those which would have some interest in or contribution to make to specific matters before the Board would include a large number of additional agencies. If the principal purpose of the Board itself, however, is viewed as providing for the correlation of psychological considerations with other considerations of the broadest and most important character the list narrows.

The importance of the Mutual Security Program to the national psychological effort and the important resources that the Mutual Security Agency can provide have lead to the proposal that this program be represented on the Board either through the Director of Mutual Security or his deputy in the Mutual Security Agency.

The placing of less emphasis by the Board upon the use of the PSB as a coordinating body on day-to-day matters as recommended in this

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

report would appear to reduce the need for enlarged permanent membership though the participation as at present of a number of agencies from time to time will continue to be desirable and necessary.

The addition of the Director of Mutual Security to permanent membership would tend to make it more difficult to prevent the addition of other agencies. One of the strengths of the present arrangement reasonably co-equal concern of each member of the Board and the fact that collectively they provide the resources in staff necessary to the Board's work. They are, in addition, the principal agencies responsible for extensive psychological operations.

The present relationships between the PSB and the NSC would become more difficult in adding to PSB membership. The DMS as a member of the NSC will continue to participate on the broad policy decisions in the psychological field which are discussed at that level.

There should continue to be close working relationships with the DMS and the Director of Mutual Security should be kept fully informed of the Board's activities and participate informally at such times as, in the Board's judgment, such participation is beneficial at the strategic planning level.

The facilities of the Mutual Security Agency are extensively used in carrying out specific operations and close liaison and coordination with the individual agencies with respect to specific operations and to operational planning generally is necessary. There will be frequent occasions when the participation of MSA staff on the panels of the Board will be mutually advantageous. The fact that this agency has so completely decentralized its planning of psychological operations to the field has in the past made participation in the Washington interdepartmental operational planning difficult. This defect can be remedied by a more substantial contribution to operational planning in the interdepartmental operations planning mechanisms. The formal representation of MSA on the PSB, however, would tend to project PSB into operational planning at the expense of the responsibilities which, by the President's Directive, remain with the departments.

It is recommended that the permanent membership of the Board not be expanded at this time but that the Board continue to utilize the provisions of the Directive for augmented membership from time to time to insure the broadest contribution in its work.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180062-3

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ **DIRECTIVE**

4 April 51

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence

It is the purpose of this directive to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.

There is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board responsible, within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

The Board will report to the National Security Council on the Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned.

For the purposes of this directive, psychological operations shall include all activities (other than overt types of economic warfare) envisioned under NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/2, the operational planning and execution of which shall remain, subject to this directive, as therein assigned.

The Board shall be composed of:

- a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absence, their appropriate designees;

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

The Board shall be composed of:

- a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absence, their appropriate designees;
- b. An appropriate representative of the head of each such other department or agency of the Government as may, from time to time, be determined by the Board.

The Board shall designate one of its members as Chairman.

A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sit with the Board as its principal military adviser in order that the Board may ensure that its objectives, policies and programs shall be related to approved plans for military operations.

There is established under the Board a Director who shall be designated by the President and who shall receive compensation of \$16,000 per year. The Director shall direct the activities under the Board. In carrying out this responsibility, he shall

- a. Be responsible for having prepared the programs, policies, reports, and recommendations for the Board's consideration,
- b. Sit with the Board and be responsible to it for organizing its business and for expediting the reaching of decisions,
- c. Promulgate the decisions of the Board,
- d. Ascertain the manner in which agreed upon objectives, policies, and programs of the Board are being implemented and coordinated among the departments and agencies concerned,
- e. Report thereon and on his evaluation of the national psychological operations to the Board together with his

TOP SECRET **SECURITY INFORMATION**

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R008300180062-3

-3-

recommendations,

- f. Perform such other duties necessary to carry out his responsibilities as the Board may direct.

The Director, within the limits of funds and personnel made available by the Board for this purpose, shall organize and direct a staff to assist in carrying out his responsibilities. The Director shall determine the organization and qualifications of the staff, which may include individuals employed for this purpose, including part-time experts, and/or individuals detailed from the participating departments and agencies for assignment to full-time duty or on an ad hoc task force basis. Personnel detailed for assignment to duty under the terms of this directive shall be under the control of the Director, subject only to necessary personnel procedures within their respective departments and agencies.

The participating departments and agencies shall afford to the Director and the staff such assistance and access to information as may be specifically requested by the Director in carrying out his assigned duties.

The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall examine into the present arrangements within their departments and agencies for the conduct, direction and coordination of psychological operations with a view toward readjusting or strengthening them if necessary to carry out the purposes of this directive. The Secretary of State is authorized to effect such readjustments in the organization established under NSC 59/1 as he deems necessary to accomplish the purposes of this directive.

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R008300180062-3

TOP SECRET **SECURITY INFORMATION**

~~TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~

-4-

This directive does not authorize the Board nor the Director to perform any "psychological operation".

In performing its functions, the board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies.

~~TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~